About the Author:
Bill Cameron is a Signal Officer in the U.S. Army with over 23 years
of service. He is a student of the Civil War and the role that the Signal Corps
played in the conflict. Colonel Cameron is stationed at Ft. Ritchie, Maryland.
Being only 20 miles from Gettysburg, he conducts Signal Corp staff rides in
conjunction with the U.S. Army War College and uses the staff ride as a professional
development tool for Signal Officers within the 7th Signal Command.
Lt. Aaron B. Jerome, a young signal officer, stood alone in the
cupola of the Lutheran Theological Seminary. It was 7 a.m. on July 1, 1863. Jerome had
ridden into town the day before with the lst Cavalry Division commanded by Brig. Gen. John
Buford. Recently assigned as Buford's signal officer, Jerome had traveled north with the
division, providing intelligence by observation and communications through the use of
signal flags.
Buford had taken quarters for the night in a Gettysburg hotel and
had sent Jerome to watch for the enemy. Jerome used the large cupola of the Pennsylvania
College on June 30, but now occupied the smaller, higher cupola at the Lutheran Seminary,
from where he could see many miles in all directions. Through the morning haze, he espied
the advanced pickets of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's Confederate division as they approached
Marsh Creek from Cashtown. Jerome immediately sent one of his couriers with word of the
advance to Buford, who quickly joined him in the cupola. The general watched the
approaching Rebels through the lieutenant's field glass, which was considerably more
powerful than his own. Leaving Jerome to his duties, Buford, realizing the importance of
the position, placed his two cavalry brigades on both sides of the Cashtown Road, in a
line blocking the advance of Heth's division. 2
Jerome had served in numerous campaigns from Antietam, where he
helped man the Elk Ridge Signal Station, to Chancellorsville, where his signal party had
swum the Rappahannock River, carrying field telegraph wire.3 He had a
reputation for being excitable but aggressive and dependable. His value to Buford was such
that the general mentioned him favorably in his Gettysburg report.4 And
after the war, Jerome wrote an impassioned letter to Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock
complaining that his old chief was not receiving just due for his actions at Gettysburg. 5 Buford died of natural causes shortly after the battle and was never a
participant in the controversy surrounding the various players of the Gettysburg drama.
On July 1 the cavalry troopers were fighting dismounted and,
although holding their own, were in immediate jeopardy of being overrun by the superior
numbers of Heth's infantrymen. Jerome, now rejoined by Buford, spotted a large body of
Union infantry approaching from the south on Emmitsburg Road and identified it to Buford
as Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds' I Corps by reading the corps' flag through his glass. 6
Reynolds, accompanied by a few staff officers, had preceded his
corps and ridden up to the seminary building, where he called to Buford in the cupola.
"In a familiar manner General Reynolds asked Buford 'how things were going on,' and
received the characteristic answer 'let's go and see.' " 7
Shortly after he had gone to the field and placed elements of Brig.
Gen. James Wadsworth's division on line near the McPherson farm, Reynolds was killed by a
sharpshooter's bullet. Jerome recalled that Buford wrote a dispatch to Maj. Gen. George G.
Meade in the lieutenant's notebook: "for God's sake send up Hancock, everything is
going at odds, and we need a controlling spirit." 8
Later, from the cupola, Jerome could see Maj. Gen. Oliver O.
Howard's headquarters party on Cemetery Hill. Howard had just arrived and assumed command
of the field. After watching Robert E. Rodes' Confederate division approaching Oak Hill
from the north, flanking the I Corps' right, Jerome sent word to Howard by flag signals.
General Howard:
Over a division of the rebels is making a Bank movement on our right; the line extends
over a mile, and is advancing, skirmishing.
There is nothing but cavalry to oppose them.
A. B. Jerome
First Lieutenant Signal Officer 9
Jerome later moved to the steeple on the Gettysburg Courthouse as
Union forces retreated through the town.10 He could see the signal
station supporting Howard's XI Corps position on East Cemetery Hill. Capts. Paul Babcock
and T. R. Clarke maintained the station until it was moved to the western part of Cemetery
Hill, where Hall's battery was located. 11 The Cemetery Hill station
became the central station during the evening of July 1.
Capt. Lemuel Norton, chief signal officer of the Army of the
Potomac, remained at the army headquarters near Taneytown during July 1. He was in receipt
of a circular from General Meade, ordering him to "examine the line thoroughly, and
at once upon the commencement of the movement extend telegraphic communications from each
of the following viz, general headquarters, near Frizeliburg, Manchester, Union Mills,
Middleburg, and Taneytown road."12 Norton made arrangements to send
the field telegraph trains forward, but they were never deployed on the battlefields.13
Norton had only recently been assigned as chief signal officer of
the Army of the Flotoniac. His predecessor had been captured by Confederates on June 17. 14 He was concerned about getting to the battlefield and placing the
various corps signal parties about the field, which on the evening of July I was still
being established. The signal parties had been assigned to each of the seven corps in
order to facilitate their movement north from Virginia. Norton had a reserve of eight
officers with their noncommissioned officers and couriers which he could place at will.
Maj. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, Meade's chief of staff, directed the captain to start at
daylight on July 2 with the reserve signal officers and join the newly established
headquarters.15
Norton was eager to connect the rear of the army with the advanced
headquarters near Cemetery Hill. He had posted a signal party at Indian Lookout, on the
mountain behind Emmitsburg, Maryland, in an attempt to establish a signal line with the
parties at Gettysburg. flag signal communication was dependent on the clarity of the
atmosphere, and, because of the haze, it was 11 p.m. before communications were
established by torch with the party on Little Round Top. 16 Maj. Gen.
John Geary's division from the XII Corps occupied that part of the line, and Lt. J. E.
Holland was probably the first of several signal officers who operated from Little Round
Top over the next several days. Late at night on July 1, a signal line was established
from Enimittsburg to Little Round Top, and on to Cemetery Hill.
Early next morning, Lieutenant Jerome climbed the rocky northern
edge of Little Round Top. Geary's division had been removed to Culp's Hill and the signal
party that had sent torch signals to Enunitsburg had packed up and left with them. Jerome
quickly understood the importance of the position for signals and observation. Standing on
a large rock, he could see the Emmitsburg Road, Jack's Mountain, Cemetery Hill, and
General Meade's headquarters. Even without the use of his glass, he could see signal
parties occupying stations on Cemetery Hill and at Meade's headquarters.17
Buford's troopers were occupying the area in front of Little Round
Top and were serving as the screen for the left flank of Meade's army. Jerome would keep
his division commander informed as to what he saw, but he also realized the importance of
reporting anything significant to the signal party at the headquarters station. He watched
intently through his field glass. His sergeant held the signal flag and had already
established contact with the other two stations.
The signal officer had the responsibility of reading the code sent
by the distant station. Jerome had learned the code while attending the Signal Camp of
Instruction at Red Hill near Georgetown, D.C. Signal officers memorized the four-element
code Maj. Albert Myer had devised, and were sworn to protect it.18 The
sergeant, who had the responsibility of signaling with the flag, did so as the officer
called out numbers indicating which way the large 4’x 4’ flag was to be swung.
The sergeants were not given the code, but by mid-1863 many had learned it through
repeated use.19
While Jerome watched the field, Captain Norton arrived at the
headquarters signal station, bringing the reserve signal officers who had been at
Taneytown. But upon arrival he found that key sites on the battlefield had already been
occupied by officers who had arrived that morning or the day before in support of the
various corps. 20 By midmorning, there were signal officers on the Culp's
Hill spur (now known as Stevens' Knoll), Power's Hill where Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum had his
right wing headquarters, Cemetery Hill, Little Round Top, and by the Widow Liester house
where Meade had his headquarters. The headquarters was becoming very active as numerous
couriers arrived with messages from all parts of the field. General Butterfield had the
responsibility of sorting through a large amount of information and providing key data to
the commanding general. Meade's chief of staff was not an advocate for the Signal Corps.
At Chancellorsville he had ordered that the flag signal line, which was passing critical
information across the Rappahannock River, be discontinued because the Confederates could
read them. The signal officers were unable to convince him that although it was true that
the information could be read by Lee's army, the information had little value to the
Confederates but was of great value to the Union. 21
Jerome, from his position on Little Round Top, swept the field with
his glass. It was nearing noon. He watched as Confederate skirmishers emerged from the
woods along Seminary Ridge. He was watching three regiments of Alabamans from Wilcox's
brigade of Maj. Gen. R. H. Anderson's division. Jerome's sergeant began to swing the large
flag, relaying the following message to Butterfield:
Mountain Signal Station
July 2, 1863,11.45 A.M.
General Butterfield:
Enemy Skirmishers are advancing from the west, one mile from here.
Jerome,
Lieut., Signal Officer 22
Minutes after Jerome sent this message he saw Berdan's Sharpshooters
under Lt. Col. Casper Trepp come into contact with Wilcox's brigade. Jerome watched as
Berdan's men fell back toward the Union line and sent a second message to the
headquarters:
Round Top Mountain Signal Station
July 2, 1863, 11.55 A.M.
General Butterfield:
The rebels are in force, and our skirmishers give way. One mile west of Round Top
Signal station the woods are full of them.
Jerome
Lieut., Signal Officer 23
Shortly after Jerome sent this message, he mounted with the rest of
his party and left with General Buford, who had been ordered to Westminster by Maj. Gen.
Alfred Pleasonton. At this point, the battle was over for Jerome.
Norton now began the process of moving about the field to ensure
that all the necessary points were covered. He accompanied Capt. P. A. Taylor and went to
Little Round Top. Taylor was assigned to the 11 Corps along with Capt. James Hall. Taylor
and Norton found Little Round Top unoccupied and began to scan the field. They discovered
the movement of the rest of Anderson's division, which had been camped a mile west of Herr
Ridge, and sent the following information to Hall who joined them and remained to make
significant observations during the afternoon:
Round Top Mountain Signal Station
July 2, 1863
Capt. Hall:
Saw a column of the enemy's infantry move into woods on ridge, three miles west of the
town, near the Millerstown road. Wagon teams, parked in open field beyond the ridge, moved
to the fear behind woods. See wagons moving up and down on the Chambersburg pike, at
Spangler's. Think the enemy occupies the range of hills three miles west of the town in
considerable force.
Norton, Taylor,
Signal Officers
[P.S.]-This is a good point for observations.24
Shortly after receiving the message, Hall joined Taylor on Little
Round Top, and Norton left to go back to the headquarters station. Hall was the senior
signal officer for the 11 Corps and as such took charge of the signal station.
James Hall was a 34-year-old native of Milesburg, Pennsylvania.
Before the war he had served as deputy sheriff of Centre County under his father and had
left for California to become a "49'er." He had been commissioned in the 53rd
Pennsylvania and had later joined the Signal Corps.25 Hall's flagman was
Sgt. John Chemberlin. 26 The small Signal party was standing on the rocks
on Little Round Top. They were intently watching the field.
Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws led the long column of Lt. Gen. James
Longstreet's corps. Maj. Gen. John B. Hood's division followed as they marched along Black
Horse Tavern Road, parallel to Marsh Creek. McLaws was proceeding along with Capt. S. R.
Johnston, the guide provided to show the way around the flank of the Union army. Shortly
after Blackhorse Tavern Road crosses the Fairfield Road, it ascends the crest of Herr
Ridge. McLaws rode to the top of the ridge and immediately halted the column. 27
He could see the large white flag that John Chemberlin was waving on Little Round Top.
McLaws quickly looked for another route with Johnson and not finding one rode back to the
column where he found Longstreet. "Ride with me," McLaws suggested, "and I
will show you that we can't go on this route, according to instructions, without being
seen by the enemy.'" 28He further insisted that the only way to
avoid being seen by the signal station was to counter- march. Lonestreet agreed but wanted
Hood's division to precede McLaws. McLaws strongly protested and Longstreet relented.
According to Col. E. P. Alexander, Longstreet's artillery chief, the
countermarch to avoid the signal station cost the Confederates more than two hours in
getting into position opposite the Federal left. No two officers in the Army of Northern
Virginia were more qualified to realize the ability of the signal station to obtain and
transmit intelligence than Alexander and McLaws. Alexander had been a student of Albert
Myer and had organized a provisional Signal Corps in the Army of Northern Virginia. McLaws
had commanded a unit which Myer supported with flag signals during the western field
trials of Myer's system.29
Later, about 1.30 p.m., from his vantage point at the Little Round
Top signal station, Hall spotted a large body of Confederate soldiers "moving from
opposite our extreme left toward our right."30 He signaled the
information to Butterfield at headquarters. Forty minutes later, he signaled an
explanation that "Those troops were passing on a by-road from Dr. Hall's House to
Herr's Tavern, on the Chambersburg Pike."31 Captain Hall was
watching a portion of Longstreet's countermarch, probably McLaws' division. It is
questionable that Butterfield or Meade understood the significance of this intelligence,
since it indicated that the movement was toward the Federal right and not in the direction
from which the attack would indeed come. Later in the afternoon, at approximately 4 p.m.,
Hall sent Meade a message telling him that "The only infantry of the enemy visible is
on the extreme [Federal] left; it has been moving toward Emmitsburg."32
Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law was convinced that Hall was reporting the movement of his troops
going into position just prior to his attack against Little Round Top. 33
It was now after 4 p.m. Hall and Taylor were alone with their signal
party on Little Round Top. Additional messages reporting troop movement opposite their
position were signaled to Meade. Suddenly, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, with his
aides, Lts. Chauncey B. Reese and Ronald S. Mackenzie, appeared at the station.34
Warren had been sent to the position by Meade at Warren's requested. 35 It is unclear if the messages as to troop movements opposite the Federal
left had an impact on Meade's decisions to send Warren, but it certainly appears that the
commanding general had ample evidence there was movement on the left. The most quoted
source as to what took place between Warren and Hall is a letter from Warren to Capt.
Porter Farley, dated July 13, 1872. 36 As it was nine years after the
battle, there is certainly room for discussion as to its accuracy. Warren recalled that
there were no troops on Little Round Top with the exception of a signal station. He
further stated "this was the key of the whole position and that our troops in the
woods in front of it could not see the ground in front of them, so that the enemy would
come upon them before they would be aware of it." 37 Warren made no
mention of the messages sent from Hall to Meade or Butterfield as to movements of Con-
federate troops. Warren stated that he requested that a rifled battery in front of the
position (Smith's 4th New York) fire a shot and when they did so, Warren could see the
"glistening of gun barrels and bayonets of the enemy's line of battle." 38Warren never mentioned that the signal officers told him that the woods
were occupied by Longstreet's men.
A radically different account was provided by J. Willard Brown,
historian of the U.S. Veteran Signal Corps Association and a friend and associate of James
Hall after the war.39 According to Brown, Hall had a difficult time,
trying to convince Warren there were Confederate troops opposite the position. "While
the discussion was in progress the enemy opened on the station. The first shell burst
close to the station, and the general, a moment later, was wounded in the neck. Captain
Hall then exclaimed, 'Now do you see them?' " 40 Conflicts in the
accounts of survivors of Civil War battles were common, and the truth probably lies
somewhere in the middle. It is difficult to believe Warren would come to the signal
station and Hall would not tell him of the troop movements he had observed. However, it
would not be uncommon for a general to check this information by personal observation.
Warren stayed near the signal station as the battle for Little Round
Top raged. Hall would leave the position later that afternoon upon orders from a Col.
Morgan to report to Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick.41
The other signal stations were also busy reporting intelligence to
the headquarters. At 4:35 p.m., Lt. N. Henry Camp, who would later join the signal party
on Little Round Top, was reporting sharpshooters in the woods at the foot of Culp's Hill.
He also reported at least two batteries of artillery which were not yet in position .42
Capt. E. C. Pierce and Lt. George J. Clarke had marched from
Westminster, Maryland, with the VI Corps and arrived on the field around 2 p.m. After a
wait of about three hours, the corps was positioned in support of the Federal left. Pierce
learned that the signal station on Little Round Top had been abandoned and decided to
occupy it.43The men positioned themselves on the rocks (to the right of
Hazlett's battery) in the same spot Hall had occupied. As night fell on the battlefield,
all of the key positions for signaling were occupied.
As soon as dawn arrived, July 3, Pierce and his party started
observing the field and began sending messages by couriers to Meade and various corps
commanders. The party could not use flags to signal because of the devastating fire from
sharpshooters positioned behind the rocks at Devil's Den.44 Pierce
reported that seven men, including some officers, were killed or wounded near the signal
station.45 Pierce's flagman was Sgt. Luther C. Furst, but Furst was
unable to send signals. The VI Corps signal party was joined by Lts. J. C. Wiggins and N.
H. Camp from the I Corps.46They helped make observations and used their
couriers to send messages.
Warren came to the signal station about 2 p.m. and ordered the
signal officers to watch certain points and make reports to General Meade.47
As Longstreet's soldiers began to come out of the woods on Seminary Ridge, couriers from
the signal station reported it to Meade's headquarters.
Brig. Gen. John Gibbon watched the Confederates emerge from the
woods across the rolling field in front of his division. He sent his aide, Lt. Frank
Haskell, to Meade's Liester House headquarters, directly behind Gibbon's position, to tell
the commanding general of the advance. When Haskell arrived, he found that Meade had
departed. He left the message with the signal officer to be sent to Meade.48
Meade's headquarters had come under intense bombardment from the Confederate cannonade.
Much of the effect of the shelling was being left behind Cemetery Ridge rather than on it
and the little house that Meade used as headquarters was taking the brunt of it. After
much urging on the part of his staff, Meade reluctantly moved his headquarters to where
Slocum had his headquarters on Power's Hill. He had learned there was a signal station
there and he wanted to use it in order to maintain contact with his present headquarters .49
When Meade arrived at Power's Hill, he Immediately sought out the
signal officer. When he found that the signal officer at Power's Hill could not contact
the station at the Liester house, Meade assumed the officer had left his post and decided
to return in order to keep in contact with the battle. 50 Capt. David
Castle was the signal officer supporting the headquarters at the Liester house. Castle's
flag-man and couriers had left with, the headquarters staff and had taken the flags and
equipment with them. When Haskell contacted Castle to send a message to Meade, he
attempted to do so by using a bedsheet as a makeshift signal flag.51
Castle had, in fact, not left his post, as Meade had thought, but in the confusion of
battle, flag communication was not established quickly enough to support the commanding
general at the Power's Hill headquarters.
After the repulse of the Pickett-Pettigrew Charge, several corps
commanders and Meade visited Pierce and his signal party on Little Round Top.52
The Little Round Top signal station remained active until July 6, when it was abandoned.
Later in the evening of July 3, Meade again moved his headquarters. It was established in
a strip of woods on the Taneytown Road, and a signal station was established there to
maintain contact with the other stations on the field.53
Captain Norton was busy placing his signal parties so that they
could make observations of the enemy. On July 4, Hall moved into the town and with Sgts.
John Chemberlin and Goodnough, and climbed to the top of the courthouse steeple which had
been used by Jerome on July 1. 4 Hall later moved to the cupola on the
Pennsylvania College and at 5:40 a.m. on July 5 he reported "that the enemy had
evacuated the position they held yesterday."55 Norton terminated
all of the signal stations with the exception of Little Round Top, the courthouse,
Cemetery Hill, and Meade's headquarters."56 On July 6 all the
stations were discontinued as the army moved south toward Frederick.
The signal activity on the Gettysburg battlefield was over. The
signalmen would later make a significant contribution near Boonsboro in support of the
Army of the Potomac's pursuit of the Confederates south of Hagerstown.
The Signal Corps' contribution during the Battle of Gettysburg is
generally understated. It is recognized that the Little Round Top signal station was the
cause of Longstreet's countermarch but the intelligence that the signal parties provided
to the senior commanders has never been fully appreciated.
In reviewing the actions of the Signal Corps at Gettysburg, it is
important to remember that the senior officer present was only a captain. There is
evidence of a significant amount of motivation, cooperation, and dedication on the part
signalmen to provide the command structure with intelligence and command and control
communications. The signal soldiers at Gettysburg are still making a contribution.
Annually the signal officers studying at the U.S. Army War College at nearby Carlisle
visit the battlefield, not only to study generalship but to learn from the young signal
captains and lieutenants who practiced their craft so many years ago.
- A. B. Jerome to W. S. Hancock, Oct. la, 1865, Bacheider Papers, New
Hampshire Historical Society.
- Ibid.
- . The War of The Rebellion.- A Compilation of the -Official Records
of the Uxion and Confederate Armies Washington, D.C., 1880-1901, Set. 1, Vol. xxv, Pt.
1, p. 218 (cited hereafter as OR.).
- O.R., Vol. xxvii, Pt. 1, P. 930.
- . Jerome, Bacheider Papers, op. cit.
. Ibid.
- Ibid. There is disagreement among historians as to where the
meeting between Buford and Reynolds took place. See Edwin Coddington, The Gettysburg
Campaign, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1984, p. 682.
- Ibid.
- . O.R., Vol. xxvii, Pt. 3, P. 488. This message from Jerome to
Howard is credited by the Official Records as having been sent on July 2. The date
was recorded in brackets, indicating that it was added by the compiler. It was listed with
other messages which Jerome did send on the 2nd from the station at Little Round Top.
Based on the text of the message, and substantiated by Jerome's letter in the Bachelder
Papers, it appears the message was in fact sent on the ist to warn of Rodes' approach and
was sent from the Lutheran Seminary.
- O.R., Vol. xxvii, Pt. 1, P. 201.
- Map of the Battle of Gettysburg, Office of the Chief of Engineers,
U.S. Army, Boston, John B. Bacheider, 1876, Plate 1.
- O.R., Vol. xxvii, Pt. 1, pp. 201-202.
- In July, 1863, the field telegraph belonged to the Signal Corps,
but most of the long distance telegraph service was provided by commercial companies which
had been federalized and placed under the Military Telegraph Service. That service was not
a part of the Signal Corps, but was a civilian bureau attached to the Quartermaster's
Department. Meade's telegraph messages to Halleck were not sent by the Signal Corps. See
William R. Plum, The Military Telegraph daring the Civil War in The United States, Arno
Press, New York, 1974, Vol. II, pp. 17-24. Also see Paul J. Scheips, "Union Signal
Communications: In- novation and Conflict," Civil War History, Vol. IX, No. 4,
Dec., 1963.
- O.R., Vol. xxvii, PL 1, P. 200.
- Ibid., p. 202.
- Ibid.
- Present day visitors to Gettysburg Military Park can stand at the
Little Round Top signal station and see most of the stations in use during the battle. The
Cemetery Hill and Liester house stations are visible to the naked eye. There is more
timber on the field now than there was in 1963 which makes the station on Powers Hill hard
to see. Winter is much better for visiting signal stations than summer because of the lack
of vegetation.
- Capt. Dana, G. S., "The Recollections of a Signal
Officer," edited by Lester L. Swift, Civil War History, State University
of Iowa, Vol. IX, No. 1, March 1963, P. 38.
- Brown, J. Willard, Signal Corps, U.S.A. in the War of the
Rebellion, New York, Arno Press, 1974, pp. 188-189.
- O.R., Vol. xxvii, Pt. 1, P. 202.
- O.R., Vol. xxv, Pt. 1, pp. 220-221.
- O.R., Vol. xxvii, Pt. 3, p. 488.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.., p. 489.
- Hugh Manchester, newspaper article, Signal Corps Papers,
Gettysburg National Military Park Library.
- 26. Minutes of the Thirteenth Annual Reunion of the U.S. Veteran
Signal Corps Association, held at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, July 2 and 3, 1888.
- Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, "Gettysburg," Southern
Historical Society Papers, Vol. vii (1879), p. 69.
- Ibid.
- . Brown, op. cit., pp. 367-368, 205, 27.
- . O.R., Vol. xxvii, Pt. 3, P. 488.
- Ibid.
- Brig. Gen. E. M. Law, "The. Struggle for 'Round Top,"' Battles
and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. iii, New York, 1884-1888, p. 320.
- Ibid.
- The exact time when Warren arrived at the signal station is not
known. Based on the time quoted for the message sent to Meade, concerning troop movement
towards Emmitsburg, it is probable Warren arrived after 4 p.m. Oliver Norton indicated it
was prior to 3.30 p.m., but in this case he is a secondary source since he was with Col.
Strong Vincent and not with Warren at the signal station. See Oliver Willcox Norton, The Attack
and Defense of Little Round Top, Morningside Bookshop, Dayton, Ohio, 1983, p. 240.
- Warren to Captain Porter Farley, Newport, Rhode Island, July 13,
1872, as quoted in Norton, p. 309.
- Ibid.
- . Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Minutes of the Thirteenth Annual Reunion of the U.S. Veteran
Signal Corps Association.
- Brown, op. cit., p. 367.
- Ibid., P. 366.
- <. O.R., xxvii, Pt. 3, pp. 489.
- Brown, op. cit., p. 361.
- < Ibid., p. 362.
- Ibid,
- Ibid.
- . Ibid.
- < Frank A. Haskell, The Bittle of Gettysbtirg, Boston,
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958, P. 101.
- Meade to Bacheider, Jan. 4, 1869, Bacheider Papers.
- Ibid.
- . G.R., Vol. xxvii, Pt. 1, pp. 203-206.
- Brown, op. cit., P. 362.
- Ibid., P. 369.
- Ibid.
- O.R., Vol. xxvii, PC. 1, P. 203. Norton, in his official
report, states the signal officer made this observation on July 4. Brown, (P. 369)
indicates it was made on the 5th. Based on known troop locations on the morning of the
4th, it appears.Norton was mistaken in his report. Although Brown directly quoted Norton's
report, he corrected the date.
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